Market power in a storable-good market , theory and applications to carbon and sulfur trading
En este artc̕ulo, los autores consideran un mercado para permisos de contaminacin̤ almacenables, en el cual un gran agente y un sector de pequeǫs agentes consumen gradualmente una reserva de permisos hasta que alcanzan un lm̕ite de emisiones a largo plazo. El equilibrio subgame perfect no exhibe po...
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| Other Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Market power in a storable-good market , theory and applications to carbon and sulfur trading |
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