Market power in a storable-good market , theory and applications to carbon and sulfur trading

En este artc̕ulo, los autores consideran un mercado para permisos de contaminacin̤ almacenables, en el cual un gran agente y un sector de pequeǫs agentes consumen gradualmente una reserva de permisos hasta que alcanzan un lm̕ite de emisiones a largo plazo. El equilibrio subgame perfect no exhibe po...

Whakaahuatanga katoa

I tiakina i:
Ngā taipitopito rārangi puna kōrero
Ētahi atu kaituhi: Liski Matti, Montero Juan Pablo, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Hōputu: Pukapuka
Reo:Ingarihi
Ngā marau:
Urunga tuihono:Market power in a storable-good market , theory and applications to carbon and sulfur trading
Tags: Tāpirihia he Tūtohu
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!